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I. INTRODUCTION
I agree with so much in Steven Smith’s splendid new book1 that it seems 
ungenerous to focus, as I shall, on the principal disagreement between us.  
But the disagreement is an important one.  It goes to the heart of the question 
Smith raises in the final pages of his book: which has more “religious 
truth,” Christianity or modern paganism?2 Before I examine our theological
differences, it is important to note a few of the political, legal, and 
constitutional points on which Smith and I agree. In practical terms these 
are surely more important than the theological subtleties that distinguish
his understanding of God from mine. So far as worldly matters are concerned,
Smith and I are comrades-in-arms and I hope he will accept me as his
pagan ally.
*  © 2019 Anthony T. Kronman.  Sterling Professor of Law, Yale Law School. 
 1.  STEVEN SMITH, PAGANS AND CHRISTIANS IN THE CITY: CULTURE WARS FROM 
THE TIBER TO THE POTOMAC (2018). 
 2.  See id. at 344–45. 
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First, Smith is right to describe our ongoing culture wars as a religious
“contest” between two parties that are both driven by ideas of sacrality and 
ultimate meaning and, hence, as a conflict that cannot be reduced to one 
of mere interests alone, as we normally understand that term.3 Something 
more important is at stake. Smith is correct to say that those who defend
what he calls the “Christian (or better perhaps, Abrahamic) position” in this 
contest are opposed on the other side not just, or most intently, by secularists
who scoff at religion but by a not-yet-well-defined party whose zeal cannot 
be understood or explained except in religious terms, even though its advocates 
do not describe their values in the explicitly theological vocabulary their
adversaries often employ.4 It is only when we view the conflict in this light
that its magnitude and implications become visible. Because its roots lie
in our deepest yearnings and most abiding convictions, we shall not be done
with it anytime soon. To suggest, as Mark Tushnet does, that “[t]he culture
wars are over,” and that the losing side should now retire in defeat, can 
most generously be characterized as a childish observation.5 Smith’s view 
is more realistic and mature. 
Second, I agree with Smith that in the crucial area of religious liberty 
and expression, the establishment and free exercise clauses have been
hijacked for partisan purposes.6 Instead of standing above the theological 
quarrel that lies at the heart of our ongoing culture wars, these constitutional 
rights have been made instruments for the advancement—sometimes aggressive,
sometimes not—of a program of reforms. These reforms are inspired by
an ideal of personal and social life that itself is conditioned by a set of 
values which in their defenders’ eyes are sacred, transcendent, independent
of all material conditions and beyond the power of time to corrupt. Like 
Smith, I regret the partisan capture of the Constitution by those on one
side in these wars and favor the restoration of the religion clauses to a
position of greater neutrality.7 I am appalled—Smith is too kind to use the
word—by the zealotry of those who today press what he calls the pagan 
cause.8 I believe that same sex couples have a constitutionally protected 
right to marry, but I am on the side of the evangelical baker who wishes 
not to be forcibly drafted into their union. Only the kind of puritanical fervor
 3.  Id. at 16.
 4.  Id.  at 136–38, 255. 
 5.  Id. at 344 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Mark Tushnet, Abandoning Defensive 
Crouch Liberal Constitutionalism, BALKINIZATION (May 6, 2016), https://balkin.blogspot.com/
2016/05/abandoning-defensive-crouch-liberal.html [https://perma.cc/ED74-XDLD]).
 6.  See id . at 304–07 (discussing both effects of the establishment clause and free 
exercise clause on religious accommodations).
 7.  See SMITH, supra note 1, at 267. 
 8.  See id. at 197–98 (describing the persistence of paganism in Western culture
today).  I think it is a mischaracterization to call their cause pagan; more on this in a moment. 
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that religion alone arouses can explain why those who are refused this
baker’s services find it so disturbing to think that, in the baker’s eyes, their 
constitutionally protected marriage is a sin. 
Third, I am not a bit upset by the continuing public presence of all the
vaguely deist symbols that have helped to shape our sense of national identity.9 
I feel no urge to scrub the wall clean. John Rawls’s rewriting of Lincoln’s
Second Inaugural would be offensive if it did not come off as quite so
silly.10 For going on three centuries now, we have lived “under the canopy” 
of words and practices of Christian provenance from which no right-
minded and even modestly self-confident non-Christian can possibly feel 
excluded.11 I am a Burkean—or rather, perhaps, a Symmachian!—for whom
traditions count. They should not be discarded lightly. The words on the
dollar bill, at a prosaic level, and Lincoln’s, at a more exalted one,12 are part
of my American identity. They help to anchor my sense of belonging to
a community whose values, however global their reach, remain those of a
people with a unique history of sacrifice and suffering. This community
is bound together not only by its commitment to the principles of freedom
and equality—which apply everywhere at all times—but by the very special
symbols of ultimate value under whose sign our predecessors made the
sacrifices they did. 
I would not know what to replace them with. And it seems certain, to me 
at least, that for the foreseeable future, no version of the modern paganism 
Smith describes will be able to generate a set of rituals, symbols, sacred
texts and the like, that have a comparable power to sustain what Lincoln 
calls the “mystic chords of memory.”13  I am a pagan, but I am a patriot
too. The campaign to cleanse our imagined community of every reference
to the creator God of the Abrahamic religions is as misguided as the not-
 9.  See, e.g., id. at 268 (“In the American republic, likewise, from the founders to
the present, statemen and citizens have appreciated the significance of public symbols.  
Through much of the nation’s history, central symbols have been biblical in character.”). 
10. See id. at 275 (citing JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 254 (expanded ed.
2005)).
11. Id. at 350 (citing RAWLS, supra note 10, at 247–51) (presenting Rawls’s opinion that 
“divisive Truth” and “potentially disruptive ‘comprehensive doctrines’” should be kept separate
from the political community to allow deliberation “under the canopy of a shared ‘public
reason’”).
12. See id. at 281. 
13. See ABRAHAM LINCOLN, INAUGURAL ADDRESS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 1, at 10 (Spec. Sess. 1861). 
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unrelated passion for renaming that is sweeping America’s campuses— 
including my own. 
In all these respects, Smith and I stand on the same ground, and I am prepared
to make common cause with him. From a political and legal point of view, 
this may be all that matters. Amidst the sound and fury of the culture wars,
theological disagreements of a rarified sort are almost certain to be 
drowned out.  But a good part of Smith’s book is devoted to the meaning
of modern paganism, and I am confident he will want to know why I think
his account of it is incorrect and incomplete. Nothing of public consequence
follows from my criticism of his views. Our disagreement is, in this sense, 
a purely private one. Yet it is not for that reason unimportant: it is the kind 
of disagreement that arises between two philosophers when they retire from 
the realm of law and public morality to consider some important matter
and discover that their views differ sharply—though both believe, with all 
their hearts, that settling the dispute between them has the urgency that
Augustine long ago ascribed to his own search for the truth. 
II. PROGRESSIVE PAGANS? 
Before I begin, though, I must make three further prefatory observations. 
The first is that the inspired champions of what Smith calls “modern”— 
or more revealingly, “progressive”—paganism share a conception of the 
sacred that is more Christian than pagan in both origin and character.14  It 
is true they do not appeal to a supernatural God to support their position.15 
But the ideal of human personality on which they base their arguments for
the elimination of religious symbols from public life as a dignitary wound 
to those who do not affirm their meaning;16 for protecting every expression 
of sexual orientation as an inalienable privilege of autonomous self-definition;17 
and for refusing to accommodate the evangelical baker on the grounds that
his conscientious belief in the sinfulness of the union of the couple who
asks for his services insults their dignity as free and equal persons:18 the
ideal of personality on which all these arguments rest is based on a Kantian 
vocabulary that itself is Christian through and through.19 
14. SMITH, supra note 1, at 360. 
15. See id. at 370. 
16. See id. at 275–77. 
17. See id. at 285–86 (discussing the sexual revolution in America and the declining 
importance of “‘sexual morality’ . . . . because, according to a common assumption, sex is a 
normal, healthy human activity that does not intrinsically call for moral restrictions”). 
18. See id. at 362. 
19. See id. at 228. 
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For Kant, nothing in our natural being either explains or justifies our 
membership in a “kingdom of ends” or the right to equal respect this entails.20 
That depends only and wholly on our power, as “noumenal” beings, to act 
in accordance “with the conception of laws,” or, in Rawls’s more down to 
earth formulation, to live according to a plan.21  To grasp the universality 
of this power and the perfect equality of its distribution among human beings, 
we must start by removing—in our imagination at least—all the natural
characteristics that distinguish one person from another and by staunchly
refusing to assign any intrinsic worth to them. Kant’s idea of a supernatural
kingdom of ends, and our membership in it, is directly derivative of the 
Christian conception of our vocation as finite rational beings created in
God’s image.22 
Kant himself remained attached to the idea of an “author of the world.”23 
Indeed, in his view, the assumption of such authorship was a transcendental
requirement.24 His contemporary followers have—for the most part—
abandoned this idea.25 But they continue to subscribe to the moral and
political philosophy that Kant constructed on the basis of his Christian
metaphysics, though without the God he thought indispensable to it.26 They
are Kantians without God. That is their religion and the supernaturalism 
on which it rests—expressed in “innerworldly” terms as the belief that
what makes every human being infinitely precious is something other 
than the sum of his or her natural properties—is, to put it mildly, difficult
to reconcile with the belief that the world has an intrinsic value of its 
own.27 This is the conviction that Smith concludes is the essence of the
paganism he associates with Ronald Dworkin, Barbara Ehrenreich, and 
others.28 At best, their paganism is an incoherent mélange of naturalist 
20. Robert Johnson & Adam Cureton, Kant’s Moral Philosophy, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHIL. (Feb. 19, 2019), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-moral/#KinEndFor [https:// 
perma.cc/HZ79-2YQ5].
21. Leif Wenar, John Rawls, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Jan. 9, 2017), https:// 
plato.stanford.edu/entries/rawls/#StaOveCon [https://perma.cc/D4ZP-RYA2].
22. See Genesis 1:27. 
23. Garrath Williams, Kant’s Account of Reason, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Mar. 30, 
2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-reason/ [https://perma.cc/KH8W-U2CH]. 
24. See id.
25. See, e.g., Andrews Reath, Two Conceptions of the Highest Good in Kant, 26 J.
HIST. PHIL. 593, 594 (1988). 
26. See id.
27. Sung Ho Kim, Max Weber, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Nov. 27, 2017), https://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/weber/ [https://perma.cc/VP5Y-UX36].
28. See SMITH, supra note 1, at 13–14. 
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and supernaturalist beliefs. But, in most cases, the supernaturalist motif 
is the stronger one, and their so-called paganism is better described as a
species of godless Kantianism coupled with the longing for a world that
has inherent value, which their own post-Christian morality rules out as a
matter of principle.
Second, Dworkin and Ehrenreich are a poor place to begin if one wants
to explore the theology of modern paganism in a serious way. Ehrenreich
has little of philosophical interest to say about the subject. Dworkin, by 
contrast, is a thinker of the first rank. But his little posthumous book on
religion gives its readers nothing of substance to chew on. Dworkin’s 
invocations of Spinoza and Einstein are suggestive at best.29 They are not
a substitute for philosophical argument. Nor are the examples he gives of 
what he means by our experience of the sacred (the Grand Canyon, et 
cetera).30  Indeed, these strike me as rather juvenile—like the gushings of
a teenager who has just read Hermann Hesse for the first time. If he had
lived, might Dworkin have gone on to develop his “religion without God”
into something more impressive?31 Perhaps, but I have my doubts; I do
not see how he could have reconciled his supernaturalist Kantianism with
his new-found love of the world for its own sake. My guess is that any
attempt on his part to develop a theology adequate to the latter experience
would have been stymied by his lifelong aversion to the endorsement of 
comprehensive views of the good, which his commitment to a certain
conception of political liberalism strongly encouraged. 
Third, and finally, the only version of paganism worth considering in a 
careful way is what Smith calls “philosophical.”32 A philosophical pagan 
may happily concede that his less reflective brothers and sisters should be 
allowed to worship the earth and sky and dance like the villagers in T.S.
Eliot’s East Coker: 
Keeping the rhythm in their dancing 
As in their living in the living seasons 
The time of the seasons and the constellations
The time of milking and the time of harvest
The time of the coupling of man and woman 
And that of the beasts.  Feet rising and falling.
Eating and drinking.  Dung and death.33 
29. See RONALD DWORKIN, RELIGION WITHOUT GOD 39 (2013).
30. See id. at 2–3. 
31. See generally DWORKIN, supra note 29. 
32. SMITH, supra note 1, at 93–94. 
33. T.S. ELLIOT, East Coker, in  THE POEMS OF T.S. ELLIOT: COLLECTED AND 
UNCOLLECTED POEMS 185, ll. 40–46, at 186 (Christopher Ricks & Jim McCue eds., 2015). 
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But he is bound to regard all these practices and beliefs as superstitious 
nonsense. This is the way, more or less, that Edward Gibbon viewed the 
pagan religion of the Romans in its practical aspects.34 For anyone seriously
interested in the question of whether modern paganism is “true,” the only 
answer that counts is the one a philosophical defender might give. 
So, is it true? This depends on what we mean by modern paganism and 
that in turn on what we mean by paganism more generally. For that, we
must go back to the ancient world—but not to the Romans, as Smith does.35 
We have to go back to the Greeks.36 
For an account of what he calls the “philosophy” of Roman religion,
Smith relies on a dialogue of Cicero’s that reports a fictional conversation
among three philosophers concerning the existence and nature of the gods.37 
It is a thin and unoriginal work which, like Cicero’s other philosophical 
writings, draws on earlier traditions of Greek thought.38 Elsewhere, Cicero 
ruefully acknowledges his own dependence, and that of the Romans more
generally, on their Greek forebears in the realm of speculative thought.39 
The great achievements of the Romans, he says, lie in the fields of law and
administration instead.40 If we want to give philosophical paganism a really 
serious hearing, we therefore need to put Cicero’s genial but derivative 
work aside and turn to the fantastically rich well of Greek philosophy from 
which the ideas even of Cicero’s contemporary Lucretius, undoubtedly the
greatest of all the Roman philosophers, derive. 
When we turn to the Greeks, we find ourselves confronted with an 
embarrassment of riches.  We might, for example, begin our inquiry with
Plato, whose influence on ancient, medieval, and Renaissance philosophy
34. See SMITH, supra note 1, at 11. 
35. See id. at 3.
36. See RONALD HUTTON, THE TRIUMPH OF THE MOON: A HISTORY OF MODERN
PAGAN WITCHCRAFT 13 (1999); John Opsopaus, Hellenic Neo-Paganism, BIBLIOTECA ARCANA
(Dec. 22, 2018, 4:51 PM), http://opsopaus.com/OM/BA/HNP.html [https://perma.cc/ ETD9-
2T7U].
37. SMITH, supra note 1, at 89–90. 
38. See generally, e.g., 19 CICERO, DE NATURA DEORUM (G.P. Goold ed., H. Rackham
trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1994) (c. 45 B.C.E.).
39. See H. Rackham, Introduction to CICERO, supra note 38, at vii, xii (“As my habit is,
I shall draw from the fountains of the Greeks at my own judgement and discretion.”). 
40. See CICERO, DE FINIBUS BONORUM ET MALORUM bk. IV, 367–69 (H. Rackham 
trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1931) (c. 45 B.C.E.).
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was immense.41 Even Galileo thought of himself as a Platonist in an
important sense.42 But that would be a poor choice if what we want is a
philosophical defense of the outlook Smith defines as the “pagan” view 
of the world.43 A pagan, Smith says, is one who believes the world possesses
an inherent divinity of its own.44 He affirms that God is in the world, or 
identical to it, not a being who “transcends” the world—a slippery word
about which I shall have more to say in due course.45 If we are looking
for a philosophy that offers a self-conscious and systematic defense of this 
view, the central teaching of Plato’s metaphysics is too ambiguous to do 
the job.
Plato did not think of the relation between the one and the many—
between the ideas and their reflections—as that of a creator to its creatures,
but as a relation of imitation or participation instead.46 The demiurge of
the Timaeus, moreover, is not a true creator but a craftsman who joins pre-
existing principles to a body of primal material already on hand.47 
Nevertheless, Plato’s depreciation of what in the Republic he calls the world 
of “sight” and “sound,”48 and the proto-creationist myth of the Timaeus,49 
seemed immediately congenial to many later Christian thinkers—Augustine 
included50—and appeared to prefigure their own view that the world
has no divinity of its own but depends for its intelligibility and value, indeed
for its very being, on a God who exists apart from the world and 
antecedently to it, and freely brings it into being from nothing.51  So, Plato
and his exegetes down to Plotinus and Proclus—who had a huge influence 
on the “negative theology” of Christian metaphysicians from the Pseudo-
41. See Paul Vincent Spade, Medieval Philosophy, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL.
(Apr. 6, 2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/medieval-philosophy/ [https://perma.cc/ 
ZF9B-MGK9].
42. See Mario De Caro, On Galileo’s Platonism, Again, in  HYPOTHESES AND
PERSPECTIVES IN THE HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE 85, 85 (Raffaele Pisano et 
al. eds., 2018); see also ALEXANDRE KOYRÉ, GALILEO STUDIES 74 (John Mepham trans.,
Humanities Press 1978). 
43. SMITH, supra note 1, at 11.
44. Id. at 114. 
45. See id.
46. See Richard Kraut, Plato, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Aug. 1, 2017), https://plato.
stanford.edu/cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=plato [https://perma.cc/5TL7-NCYA].
47. Barbara Sattler & Donald Zeyl, Plato’s Timaeus, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL.
(Mar. 24, 2019), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato-timaeus/ [https://perma.cc/8ZBP-
3HPL].
48. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO IN TEN BOOKS bk. VII, at 213–14 (Ernest Rhys ed.,
H. Spens trans., J.M. Dent & Co. 1908) (c. 380 B.C.E.).
49. See Sattler & Zeyl, supra note 47. 
50. See generally  AUGUSTINE THROUGH THE AGES: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA (Allan 
D. Fitzgerald et al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter AUGUSTINE].
51. See generally id.; Sattler & Zeyl, supra note 47. 
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Dionysius to Eckhart and even on thinkers with as strongly rationalist an
orientation as Thomas Aquinas—do not give us the best material from 
which to reconstruct the most philosophically compelling account of the 
immanentist theology to which a thoughtful pagan of the ancient sort might
subscribe. 
III. ARISTOTLE
A better choice is the philosophy of Aristotle, who in Raphael’s famous
painting is pointing down to the earth and not, like Plato, up to a sphere
beyond it. Aristotle’s God is a thoroughly immanent one, in Smith’s sense
of the term.52 There is another reason, too, for beginning with Aristotle,
although I will not pursue it at length here. The late medieval physics
based on Aristotle’s recently recovered writings on nature was the target
of the fundamentalist revival that in the name of the world-transcending,
all-powerful God of the bible first challenged Aristotle’s picture of the 
world in a radical way.53  In so doing, it laid the foundations for what, in
the next three centuries, would become the recognizably modern physics
of Copernicus,54 Galileo,55 Descartes,56 and Newton.57 
Modern science was born in a theologically-motivated reaction against 
Aristotle’s metaphysical immanentism.58 In this sense, its beginnings were 
religiously inspired. If science today seems a profoundly anti-religious force,
this was not always the case. But to understand how and why the science 
that now surrounds us—and to which so many godless secularists appeal
for support—first emerged from a theological quarrel over the very two views 
of divinity that Smith calls “Christian” and “pagan,”59 one needs first to grasp
52. See generally SMITH, supra note 1. 
53. For background on Aristotle’s metaphysics, see Marc S. Cohen, Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Oct. 19, 2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ 
aristotle-metaphysics/ [https://perma.cc/K3D7-6X22].
54. See Sheila Rabin, Nicolaus Copernicus, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Aug. 5, 
2015), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/copernicus/ [https://perma.cc/H2R5-J6BW].
55. See Peter Machamer, Galileo Galilei, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (May 10,
2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/galileo/ [https://perma.cc/T5ST-NFW2].
56. See Edward Slowik, Descartes’ Physics, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Aug. 22,
2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes-physics/ [https://perma.cc/D698-48RE]. 
57. See George Smith, Isaac Newton, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Aug. 29, 2008), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/newton/ [https://perma.cc/2RWC-CNAQ].
58. See generally Glanville Downey, Aristotle and Modern Science, 57 CLASSICAL
WORLD 41 (1963).
59. SMITH, supra note 1, at 167. 
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the latter view in its original Aristotelian form, for it was to this that the 
Bishop of Paris reacted with evangelical fervor in his Condemnation of 
1277.60 Others have told the story at great length, among them Pierre Duhem61 
and more recently, Hans Blumenberg.62 But the fact that the Condemnation
of 1277—which Duhem calls the “birth certificate” of the modern age63— 
was inspired by a holy hatred of Aristotle’s immanentist theology gives 
us an additional reason to take the latter as our starting point in the search
for a philosophically adequate understanding of paganism, as opposed to the 
thin and unconvincing version that Cicero puts in the mouth of his Stoic 
spokesman Balbus.64 
Aristotle’s overarching aim might be described in John Wisdom’s lovely
phrase: “to find the order in the drama of Time.”65 Living things, ourselves
included, come and go.  We’re born, live for a while, then die.  Warmed by
the sun, water rises and forms clouds, then falls again as rain.  Even the
heavenly bodies—which Plato calls the “visible eternal”—are one place
today and another tomorrow, revolving in their endless circles in the sky.66 
Everything in the world dances to the music of time.  But the order of the 
music—its arrangement or score—never changes. It has always been and 
will always be what it is at any moment. This order is not, moreover, something
apart from the movements of the things we see in the world about us. It 
is the shape or rule or form of these movements themselves and can no 
more be detached from them than the score of a Beethoven symphony can 
be separated from the sounds of the orchestra that plays it. It is the principle
of changelessness in change, without which motion would be chaos rather
than a structured movement from here to there: from childhood to maturity,
solstice to equinox, or cold to hot when a stone is placed near the fire. 
This order is eternal in a twofold sense. First, it is everlasting: it has no 
beginning or end in time.67 Second, it is necessary: its nonexistence is 
60. See Hans Thijssen, Condemnation of 1277, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Nov.
19, 2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/condemnation/ [https://perma.cc/U7BK-WTUE].
61. See id.
62. See Alexander S. Jensen, The Unintended Consequences of the Condemnation
of 1277: Divine Power and the Established Order in Question, 41 COLLOQUIUM: AUSTL.
& N.Z. THEOLOGICAL REV. 57, 71 (2009). 
63. Douglas M. Jesseph, Essay Review, 1 J. INT’L SOC’Y HIST. PHIL. SCI. 317, 319
(2011).
64. See Malcolm Schofield, Cicero for and Against Divination, 76 J. ROMAN STUD. 47, 
57 (1986).
65. SMITH, supra note 1, at 27 (quoting John Wisdom, The Meanings of the Questions 
of Life, in THE MEANING OF LIFE 257, 258–59 (E.D. Klemke ed., 1981)).
66. Anthony T. Kronman, Civility, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 727, 748 (1996). 
67. The Beginning of Time, STEPHEN HAWKING (1996), http://www.hawking.org.
uk/the-beginning-of-time.html [https://perma.cc/6YYV-BEV3].
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unthinkable.68 It is inconceivable that it not not be.69 In this respect, the
eternal order of the world, and therefore the world itself, differ from my
existence as an individual human being.70  That I not be is perfectly conceivable. 
In this sense, my existence is contingent, not necessary. Later Abrahamic 
philosophers, beginning with Avicenna, stressed exactly this point in 
distinguishing their views from that of Aristotle.71 The existence of the
entire world, they said, is as contingent as that of every individual in it.72 
Only the God who creates the world, from a position beyond it, exists by
necessity.73 Everything else is contingent, including the order or form or
shape of the world, which Aristotle believed to be not only everlasting but
necessary as well.74 This crucial metaphysical distinction was the bone of
contention that moved the neo-Augustinian champions of orthodoxy at the
end of the thirteenth century to condemn the Latin Averroists with such
religious fervor.75 That drove a permanent wedge between Aristotle’s old 
and soon discredited physics and the new one that was aborning.
But this distinction—deep as it is—should not obscure an even deeper
point of agreement between the Aristotelians and their Christian opponents.
For both, the “drama of Time” is intelligible only on account of its connection 
to something eternal, which lasts from age to age and exists by necessity.76 
Only this relation secures the explicability of what happens in time.77  It
alone gives the appearance and disappearance of things its meaning. In
particular, we could make no sense of our mortality without it.78 The nature
of the relation between time and eternity is therefore the most serious subject 
of all.  It is the one to which all our other studies must be directed and an 
occasion for the highest sort of joy, wonder, and exaltation that any human
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See Ivano Dal Prete, “Being the World Eternal . . .”: The Age of the Earth 
in Renaissance Italy, 105 ISIS 292, 297 (2014). 
71. Sajjad H. Rizvi, Avicenna (Ibn Sina), INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., https://www.iep.
utm.edu/avicenna/ [https://perma.cc/8B28-5TR6].
72. Id.
73. Olga Lizzini, Ibn Sina’s Metaphysics, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Mar. 28, 2019),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ibn-sina-metaphysics/ [https://perma.cc/2ZC6-MSA7].
74. Id.
75. See Latin Averroism, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA (Apr. 28, 2009), https://www. 
britannica.com/topic/Latin-Averroism [https://perma.cc/57V3-4LCT]. 
76. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
77. Lizzini, supra note 73; see also SMITH, supra note 1, at 118. 
78. See generally The Beginning of Time, supra note 67. 
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being can know. This was Aristotle’s view.79  But so do Augustine80 and 
Aquinas.81 It is true that in the first case, the eternity to which the comings 
and goings of things must be related in order to make sense and have any
meaning at all is the eternity of the world and in the second case, an eternity 
beyond it. But however important this difference may be, viewed from a
sufficient distance it might be described as a family quarrel. From this 
perspective, the nihilist stance that some contemporary secularists at least
pretend to adopt is wholly incomprehensible for it rests on the contention, 
which none of the three thinkers I have just mentioned would have found
intelligible let alone appealing,82 that we can get by just fine without any
conception of eternity at all, and must learn to find what meaning we can, 
in life and the world as a whole, as grownups who no longer need such a
childish crutch. 
I do not think that nihilism of this sort is philosophically coherent, and
I certainly do not find it to be an attractive guide to life—or even a humanly 
bearable one for that matter. But I put the defects of nihilism aside for the 
sake of considering the virtues of the two competing conceptions of 
eternity from which Aristotle and his Christian successors begin.  Any
philosophically responsible judgment about the comparative “truth” of the 
modern pagan and orthodox Christian conceptions of God must start here. 
For Aristotle, every being in the world has a share in eternity.83  Like
Plato before him and Plotinus after, Aristotle equated the eternity that is
resident in finite things—this cat, that star, a drop of water, you and me—
with the principle of intelligibility that explains their characteristic movements,
understanding the term broadly to include growth as well as “locomotion.”84 
Movement of any kind includes an element of “nonbeing.”85 What moves 
is no longer where or what it was before; it has ceased to be in its previous 
place or state. But the principle or rule according to which the movement 
proceeds from one point to another does not “itself” move.86 It is perfectly
79. See generally ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS (W.D. Ross trans., Univ. of Adelaide
2015) (c. 350 B.C.E.). 
80. See generally AUGUSTINE, supra note 50. 
81. See generally THOMAS AQUINAS, THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA (Fathers of the English 
Dominican Province trans., Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. 1987) (1485). 
82. See, e.g., THOMAS AQUINAS, ON THE ETERNITY OF THE WORLD 46 (Cyril Vollert et
al. trans., Marquette Univ. Press 1964) (1271) (“[T]he world existed from eternity. . . . 
[S]ince He produced the world at some time, He apparently has always produced it, from 
eternity.”). 
83. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 79, bk. I. 
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motionless and therefore both timeless and necessary—eternal in the twofold
sense noted above.87 
Different kinds of things move according to different principles.  For
each, its principle plays both a causal and a logical role.88 It is at once 
a source of motion and the explanation for it. Crucially, for Aristotle, the 
same may—indeed must—be said of the world as a whole.89 All the motions 
in the world must be both caused and explained by a single master principle 
from which every limited principle of movement derives. Aristotle calls
this master principle the “unmoved mover.”90  It is the logical and causal
ground of the world as a whole whose eternity is guaranteed by the unmoved 
mover, which is not a principle or force apart from the world but its own
inherent orderliness in whose presence every finite being shares according 
to what Aristotle calls the “powers” of its kind.91 
Human beings share in the eternity of the world in a way that is unique,
at least among living things on earth.92 Other earthly animals participate
directly in the principle that gives their mortal lives a timeless regularity 
simply by living as they do and producing others like themselves who will 
do the same when they are gone.93  Human beings also share in the eternal
wheel of birth, growth and death, but unlike our animal friends, we are able
to grasp in thought the principle that guides our lives and not merely live
it out.94 We are thinking beings as well as living ones, and because the power
of thought has a universal range, we are able to comprehend not only the
rule or principle of our own species-being but that of every other kind of 
thing in the world as well.95 Indeed, we are able not merely to understand 




89. See id. For an alternate argument to this singular force, see ORSON PRATT, GREAT 
FIRST CAUSE, OR THE SELF-MOVING FORCES OF THE UNIVERSE 8 (Liverpool, 1851). 
90. ARISTOTLE, supra note 79, bk. XI. 
91. See id. at 267. 
92. See id. bk. I. I add the qualification because Aristotle believed the planets and
stars to be living beings as well.  See id. bk. XII. 
93. Id. bk. I (“The animals other than man live by appearances and memories, and 
have but little of connected experience . . . .”). 
94. Id. (explaining that unlike nonhuman animals, “the human race lives . . . by art and 
reasonings” in addition to “appearances and memories”). 
95. Id.
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This latter understanding culminates in a fully articulable knowledge of 
the relation of all things to the “unmoved mover,” their ultimate causal
and logical ground.96 This is the highest knowledge that any human being
can attain. Indeed, it is the highest knowledge that any being can attain.
Aristotle describes the content of this knowledge in Metaphysics.97  His
fullest account of the experience of achieving it is to be found in the
last book of the Nicomachean Ethics.98  The rest of the Ethics is devoted
to an examination of the challenges of “practical life.”99  But it is only in
“contemplation,” Aristotle says, that our rapport with the eternity of the world
is complete.100 Because the intelligibility, meaning, and value of human 
life, like that of everything else in the world, depends on its relation to
eternity, the activity of thinking, where this relation becomes an identity—
for a brief time at least—therefore serves in Aristotle’s philosophy as a
benchmark against which to measure the meaning and value of all other
human “activities” including, in particular, those of a political kind.101 
All this will be familiar to anyone who has spent any time studying 
Aristotle’s philosophy in even a casual way. I want now to describe three
implications of Aristotle’s idea of eternity that may not be as immediately
obvious but bear directly on any attempt to evaluate its strengths and
weaknesses vis-à-vis the Christian idea of eternity. All three ideas follow
from Aristotle’s characteristically Greek equation of eternity with intelligibility
and of both of these with form.
In the Greek philosophical imagination, the principle of order that gives 
a thing its structure and intelligibility is always conceived, in plastic terms, as
its “shape” or “form.”102 This is true not only of artificial things but natural
ones as well.103 In each case, it is a thing’s form that makes it what it is—that 
defines it.104 In his famous account of the diverse ways the “existence”
and motions of a thing can be explained, Aristotle identifies form as only
96. Id. bk. XI. 
97. See generally id.
98. See generally ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. X (J.E.C. Welldon 
trans., MacMillan & Co. 1912) (c. 350 B.C.E.). 
99. Id. bk. I, at 15; id. bk. VI, at 188.
100. Id. bk. IV, at 109. 
101. Id. bk. I, at 1–2, 24–25; id. bk. IX, at 307 (“One who sees perceives that he sees, and 
one who hears that he hears, and one who walks that he walks, and similarly in all our 
activities there is something in us which perceives that we exercise the activity . . . . But 
to perceive or understand that we perceive or understand, is to perceive or understand that 
we exist; for existence consists . . . in perceiving or understanding.” (footnote omitted)); id. bk. 
X, at 332–37. 
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one among several.105 But all the other ways are ultimately reducible to 
this one. In the end, the “formalist” explanation of a thing’s structure and 
behavior—which for Aristotle are not fundamentally distinguishable—
proves to be the only way of accounting for them at the very deepest level.106 
Even materialist explanations depend upon the crucial assumption that the 
matter of a thing causes it to act and move as it does only because the matter
in question is, as it were, “preformed”—that is, endowed with the power 
or potency to assume one form rather than another.107  As a consequence,
Aristotle’s seemingly complex account of the varieties of explanation is 
at bottom indistinguishable from Plato’s more straightforward identification
of “intelligibility” with form.108 
From a theological point of view, the most important implication of this
is that the aspect or component of a thing, which gives it a share in eternity,
must also necessarily be finite as well.  By “finite,” I do not mean limited 
in duration or accidental in origin. For Aristotle, the form of a thing is 
neither.109 I mean, having a shape that delimits and therefore defines it—
a ‘boundary’ or ‘edge’ without which it would be shapeless and therefore— 
given Aristotle’s equation of form and intelligibility—completely 
unintelligible.110 
In Aristotle’s metaphysics, as in Plato’s, the concept of infinity describes a
condition of boundlessness that resists all comprehension and therefore— 
the crucial therefore of Greek philosophy—lacks all being or reality as
well.111 To be infinite, for both Aristotle and Plato, is to be unreal. In their
theologies, the concept of a principle of order that is at once eternal and
finite is therefore not a contradiction in terms but a logical necessity.112 
This is hard for us to grasp; we are habituated by centuries of Christian 
105. Istvan Bodnar, Aristotle’s Natural Philosophy, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL.
(Jan. 8, 2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-natphil/ [https://perma.cc/KF2Z- 
K7SR].
106. Ainsworth, supra note 102; see also Marino Pérez Álvarez, The Four Causes of
Behavior: Aristotle and Skinner, 9 INT’L J. PSYCHOL. & PSYCHOL. THERAPY 45, 48 (2009). 
107. See Peter K. Machamer, Aristotle on Natural Place and Natural Motion, 69 ISIS
377, 380 (1978). 
108. Allan Silverman, Plato’s Middle Period Metaphysics and Epistemology, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (July 14, 2014), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato-metaphysics/
[https://perma.cc/YPB7-GXWC]. 
109. See Bodnar, supra note 105. 
110. See Cohen, supra note 53; see also Machamer, supra note 107, at 380. 
111. See A.W. Moore, Infinity, ROUTLEDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., https://www.rep.
routledge.com/articles/thematic/infinity/v-1/sections/aristotle-1 [https://perma.cc/F5PG-XMN2]. 
112. See Ainsworth, supra note 102. 
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theology to think of these two properties as essentially joined.113 Aristotle’s
view is the opposite.  Not only is each thing’s share of the eternal and divine
conditioned on the separation of these properties, but the eternity of the 
world as a whole is as well.114  Aristotle’s finite cosmos was superseded
long ago by the infinite universe we think of ourselves as inhabiting today.115 
(The Condemnation of 1277 was the crucial first step in this process.) But
if we  want to  grasp the feature of  Aristotle’s theology that  separates it
most fundamentally from any that a modern pagan might endorse today,
we have to start by understanding that the finitude of the world was not, 
for him, a sign of its transience and contingency, as it is was for Augustine 
and all the Christian thinkers who followed in his path, but the necessary 
complement of the world’s eternality instead.
This is the first and most important of the implications of Aristotle’s 
view of eternity. A second is closely related: if the form of a thing alone 
makes it intelligible and thereby gives it a share in eternity—note the thereby! 
—then what cannot be explained by its form must be mindless and without 
any connection to what exists forever and by necessity.116 But natural and 
artificial things are not composed of form alone in the way that mathematical 
objects are. They are “hybrids” of form and matter.117 The latter is what
distinguishes the individual members of each kind from one another. But 
it is not itself intelligible. It is true that we can understand the parts of
a thing, but that is only because the parts themselves have a characteristic
form of their own. Their individuality is no more intelligible than that of
the thing of which they are parts. The upshot is that the uniqueness of each 
individual thing, whether it be a freestanding whole or the part of one, is 
not at bottom understandable at all. It is therefore—once again!—not only 
cut off from eternity, from the “really real,” but has not the smallest drop
of being in it.  It is in fact the essence of non-being.  We of course have grown
used to the idea that the individuality of individuals is not merely real but 
the most real thing about them.  From our perspective, Aristotle’s theology 
turns this truth on its head, as it surely does if one starts from the Abrahamic 
premise that every individual is infinitely “precious” in the eyes of God.118 
113. See Infinity and Eternity, NEW CHRISTIAN BIBLE STUDY, https://newchristian
biblestudy.org/exposition/translation/infinite-and-eternal/contents/ [https://perma.cc/E6AA- 
XGHR] (“In New Christian theology, there is an infinite, eternal God.”). 
114. See Ainsworth, supra note 102. 
115. See Mohan Matthen & R.J. Hankinson, Aristotle’s Universe: Its Form and Matter, 
96 SYNTHESE 417, 418–19 (1993).  See Thijssen, supra note 60. 
116. See Thomas Davidson, Conditions of Immortality According to Aristotle, 8 J.
SPECULATIVE PHIL. 143, 150–52 (1874). 
117. Ainsworth, supra note 102 (“Aristotle famously contends that every physical 
object is a compound of matter and form.”). 
118.  Isaiah 43:4. 
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But if one starts instead with Aristotle’s concept of form, and his use of 
the distinction between form and matter, to explain why individuals that 
share a common nature are nevertheless distinct, no other conclusion is 
possible.119 
This brings me to the third implication of Aristotle’s idea of eternity. It 
is logically inseparable from the previous two. If the highest state of
reality that a human being can attain consists in the understanding of what 
is understandable in the world—in “mind minding mind,” as Aristotle 
puts it; if the world’s intelligibility resides in the forms of things and, at 
the top of the metaphysical chain, in the cosmic principle of enformed-
ness that Aristotle calls the unmoved mover; and if the form of the world, 
while eternal, is finite as well, then it must be possible for finite beings 
such as we to fully comprehend eternity—to get our minds around it, so 
to speak.120  And this of course is just what Aristotle says.121 
We may not be able to retain our comprehension for long. In this respect,
we are unlike the planets and stars, which too are thinking beings but ones 
that spend eternity thinking about thought—though from ever-changing 
points of view so that even their contemplative activity falls short of the 
perfect motionlessness of its object.122 But in those moments of understanding,
however brief they may be, we have all of eternity in our minds, without
remainder. There is nothing about the God of the world that escapes us
or remains to be explored.
That is the good news, one might say. The more disturbing news, 
for some at least, is that in these moments we have no individuality at all.
If the peak of contemplation is complete, it is also wholly impersonal. The
equation of eternity with intelligibility, and both of these with form,
guarantees the one as much as the other. This was a particularly hard 
conclusion for theologians in the Abrahamic traditions to accept, as the 
fierce debate in all three over the question of personal immortality makes 
clear.123 
119. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, CONFESSIONS OF A BORN-AGAIN PAGAN 319 (2016). 
120.  Id. at 319, 555, 757. 
121. See id.
122. See id. at 758. 
123. See id. at 89.
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IV. PAGANS AND CHRISTIANS
Aristotle’s conception of eternity and the immanentist theology whose
elaborate superstructure it sustained, including, in particular, the three 
implications I have mentioned, all came crashing down under the pressure
of a radically different idea of God whose consequences for Aristotle’s
pagan theology were fundamental and far-reaching.124 
The biblical idea of God preserves the assumption, which Aristotle fully
accepted, that the “drama of Time”125 can be rescued or redeemed only by
being related to eternity in some fashion.126  But it transports eternity to a
God beyond the world, with the result that the world itself ceases to exist 
either forever or by necessity. It further reimagines the relation between
God and the world as one of will, not mind. The God of those who embraced 
this radically un-Greek view of eternity must now be thought of as having
brought the world into being from nothing through an act of unfettered
agency that God might have exercised however he wished—or not at all.127 
The consequences of this shift in the location of eternity and in the understanding
of God’s relation to the world touch every aspect of Aristotle’s theology.128 
First, God must now be conceived as an eternal and infinite being.  For
Aristotle, these two properties are not merely disjoined. They are logically
opposed. For those who believe in the creator God of the Abrahamic religions, 
the same characteristics are welded together with an iron necessity. 
The Christian God is a timeless, necessary being. But the world that he 
creates is neither.  It might not exist and could perfectly well have a different 
shape than it does. The world exists by the “grace” of God.129 In creating 
the world and in giving it the order it has, God exercises a power of choice 
that is not constrained by any limits at all. Since Augustine, this power 
has been known as the “will.”130 In contrast to reason, as Aristotle understood
it, the will is defined by its boundlessness or what today we call its “freedom.”131 
In this sense, its power is infinite.  That is why Aristotle not only lacks an idea 
of the will in the Augustinian sense of the term but could not possibly
124. See id. at 337. 
125. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
126.  See KRONMAN, supra note 119, at 107–08, 290. 
127.  See id. at 241. 
128. See id. at 332. I ignore the complications presented by those Muslim, Jewish, 
and Christian philosophers who were prepared to grant that the world as a whole has
no beginning or end in time so long as we acknowledge that its sempiternal existence is as
contingent as everything in the world and therefore presupposes the ontologically prior 
being of a God whose non-existence is unthinkable. 
129. Id. at 307. 
130. Michael Mendelson, Saint Augustine, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Dec. 7, 2018),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/augustine/#Wil [https://perma.cc/XL2J-5P6C].
131. KRONMAN, supra note 119, at 408. 
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have formed one; it is also why, once God’s creative freedom is assumed
to be his most essential characteristic, it is necessary to think of him as a being 
that is infinite as well as eternal (for Aristotle, a contradiction in terms).
Some, of course, have tried to “tame” God’s will by subjecting it to the 
requirements of reason.132  Aquinas133 and Leibniz134 are examples.  But no
orthodox Christian can accept such a view because it puts God’s freedom
“in chains.”135 The subordination of God’s will to his reason represents a
step back toward a pagan idea of God and must therefore be resisted at all 
costs. This is the key to understanding the meaning of the nominalist revolt
against late medieval scholasticism and the Protestant Reformation that
followed from it.136  But so long as God’s will remains perfectly free, the
infinity and eternality of his divine nature cannot be pried apart.  The Christian
theology within whose matrix all the currents of Western thought and 
experience flowed from Late Antiquity on, fused these two characteristics in 
a fashion that made it impossible ever again to think of them as contradictory 
terms, in the way that Aristotle and his intellectualist predecessors had.137 
A second important consequence of the biblical revolution in theology 
follows directly from the attribution to God of an infinite will. If God’s
creative power is infinite, there can be nothing outside it to impede or 
deflect God’s exercise of it. His creation must be ex nihilo, in the ever-
more rigorous sense that the Latin Church Fathers—with an assist from
Philo—came to understand this term.138 But this means that everything in 
the world owes its being to God—not just the forms of things but their
132. See id. at 557. 
133. See Ralph McInerny & John O’Callaghan, Saint Thomas Aquinas, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (May 7, 2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aquinas/ [https://perma.cc/
3LPQ-FXNJ]. 
134. See Yitzhak Y. Melamed & Martin Lin, Principle of Sufficient Reason, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (June 9, 2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sufficient-reason/# 
WhyDidLeibBeliPSR [https://perma.cc/XAS9-RXHR] (explaining Leibniz’s approach to
reason and God). 
135. KRONMAN, supra note 119, at 338. 
136. See id. at 866. 
137. See id. at 336–37. As a historical side note, it is perhaps worth pointing out 
that although Plotinus remained firmly within the intellectualist tradition of Greek thought, 
his concept of “the One” prepared a bridge of sorts to the radically different idea of God 
that his Christian imitators embraced by defining the One as an infinite power beyond the
limits implied by any predication at all, including that of “being” itself. Lloyd Gerson, 
Plotinus, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (June 28, 2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
fall2018/entries/plotinus/ [https://perma.cc/2XUV-G9A7] (emphasis added) (describing “the
One” as one of three basic principles of Plotinus’ metaphysics). 
138. See KRONMAN, supra note 119, at 238. 
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individuality as well.139 The individuality of every individual must also
be God’s creative work and hence endowed with the same meaning and 
value the world as a whole possesses. This applies to all individuals but 
in a special way to human beings on whom God freely chose to confer the 
same freedom he possesses, though in our case joined to appetites, desires,
and needs, making us creatures who are infinite in one way but woefully 
finite in another: the defining characteristic of the human condition as
Christian thinkers down to Kant and beyond have conceived it. But this 
important distinction between our condition and that of God’s other creatures—
angels aside—does not alter the basic fact that the individuality of 
everything in the world owes its being to God and therefore has the same 
link to eternity as the general laws or principles that governs their movement. 
Nothing could be farther from Aristotle’s pagan theology.
Third, and finally, the infinitization of God’s eternal being means that
as finite beings we can never fully comprehend him.140 Only if we imagine
that we shall one day be released from the finitude that now confines us 
within such narrow straits, is it even thinkable that our desire to know and
worship God will be fulfilled. So long as we live in this world, the
fulfillment of this longing remains beyond our reach. Christian mystics 
have for centuries claimed to have at least a foretaste of what this will be 
like.  But the greatest of them, from Dionysius to Eckhart, have insisted 
that their wisdom can only be expressed in negative terms that recognize 
the incapacity of finite beings to convey the experience of closing the gap
between themselves and God.141 Once again, Aristotle’s confident belief 
that it is possible, in this life, to understand all that can be understood about 
God, if only for short periods of time, is worlds away from the Christian 
conviction that even the suggestion that such knowledge is attainable is 
an unpardonable act of pride. 
V. A THIRD THEOLOGY
We are now in a position to make a side-by-side comparison of the two
theologies I have described. Both insist that the “drama of Time” has 
meaning and value only in relation to eternity.142 Both also assume that 
the God who anchors time and saves it from chaos and unintelligibility exists 
not only eternally but necessarily as well. On the one hand, Aristotle’s God 
is the eternal and necessary order of the world itself: it is finite, as all order 
139. Id. at 279, 332. 
140. Id. at 946. 
141. See id. at 119, at 450–51. 
142. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
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must be.143 Because the individuality of individuals is due to their matter, 
as opposed to their form, it has no share in eternity. It has no reality at all.
But by the same token, and for the same reason, a finite human being can, 
with enough effort, grasp all the reality there is. He can completely understand
God. 
The Christian God, by contrast, exists beyond the world. In one sense
of that very ambiguous term, he “transcends” the world. Because his power 
is infinite as well as eternal, it can neither be constrained nor fully understood. 
The individuality of individuals is part of his divine creation too and even
the most devout human being, who works with dedication for a lifetime 
to comprehend the majesty of God, can never take more than an infinitesimal
step toward such understanding.
As between these two theologies, then, which is the truer? For a modern
man or woman, the answer is clear. The Christian conception of God has
more “religious truth.”144 
There are two reasons why this is so. The first concerns the value of the 
individual; the preciousness of every individual human being is something
we all now take for granted.145 Our deepest moral commitments and most
widely-shared political ideals depend on this assumption. It is one that 
socialists, liberals, libertarians, and traditionalists share in common. But 
Aristotle’s pagan theology provides no basis for this belief. Indeed, it rules it
out as a matter of principle. By contrast, the Christian idea of God ensures
that our devotion to the sanctity of the individual has a solid basis in the 
answers we give to the most elementary questions of philosophy: Why 
does the world exist? Why is there a world at all? Why is there something 
rather than nothing?  What is the being of beings?  Does everything have 
a beginning and end in time? Christianity has answers to all these questions
and the inestimable advantage that it enjoys over Aristotelianism today is 
in part a consequence of the fact that the answers it gives undergird and
support the reverence for the individual that lies at the heart of our most 
deeply entrenched practices and beliefs.146 
The second reason for choosing the Christian religion over Aristotle’s 
version of paganism is that the former explains, while the latter rules out,
143. See supra Part III. 
144. KRONMAN, supra note 119, at 89. Again, I am putting to one side the nihilist
who denies that the idea of eternity is needed to rescue the meaning of what happens in 
time or insists that the idea itself is incoherent. 
145. Id. at 86. 
146. See id. at 89. 
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the gap that exists between our comprehension of the world—ourselves 
included—and the comprehensibility that always exceeds it.  The same is
true of our efforts to live well, behave responsibly, and celebrate the world 
in art.147 In every human enterprise, there is always more to be done than 
we have done so far—or shall ever be able to do, individually or collectively,
in any finite stretch of time.  Our aesthetic efforts, scientific pursuits, and 
personal spiritual struggles are all conditioned by the experience of the
ineliminable gap between aim and fulfillment.148  Nothing is more characteristic 
of modern life in all its domains.  To the extent we are modern at all, we 
cannot escape it. Aristotle’s theology denies that such a gap can exist, but
its Christian counterpart mandates it. That is another compelling reason 
for preferring the latter, if we must choose between the two. 
But we need not do so. Our choice is not so limited.  There is a third
theology that fuses features of the other two in a distinctive way.  It might
be called a brand of paganism too, but it certainly is not Aristotle’s.  A better
way of describing it would be to say that it is a form of ancient paganism that
has been transformed by its baptismal passage through the crucible of
Christian belief. The result is a distinctively modern paganism that preserves 
the benefits of this transformation while avoiding the disadvantages of the 
Christian theology that prompted and guided it. If the God of the Christian 
religion is preferable to Aristotle’s, the God of this modernized paganism 
is preferable to the Christian version. This is the “religious truth,” as I see 
it, and remains such regardless of how few understand it and how little it 
contributes to the spirit of community on which the American adventure 
in religious freedom depends. 
The basic outlines of this third theology are easily described.  Its God,
like that of the Christian religion, is an eternal and infinitely powerful being.149 
In this respect, it differs fundamentally from all forms of ancient paganism,
including Aristotle’s. But the one, eternal and infinitely powerful being 
of my modern paganism is not a God separate from the world but the world 
itself—or perhaps it would be better to say the universe, or even the whole 
endless sequence of universes, past, present, and future, to avoid confusing
the God of the world with what we now know is merely one small corner
of it.150 Yet even on this radically extended view of what Christians call 
the realm of “worldly” things—for whose expansion to infinity Christian 
theology itself is responsible—no gulf or gap exists between God and the 
world.  Indeed, no gap of this kind can exist.  The one extends as far as 
147. See id. at 540. 
148. See id. at 968. 
149. See id. at 585. 
150. See id. at 1065. 
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the other because they are the same, though we conceive them, as Spinoza
says, in a phrase that Dworkin repeats, under “different aspect[s].”151 
Viewed from one perspective, the world appears to be an infinite collection 
of individual beings—infinite in number and diversity too. Every one of
these is finite: it is one place rather than another; has certain characteristics
but lacks others; and lasts only for a part of time. But each is also an
infinitesimal part of an infinite whole, and its own distinctive being cannot 
be understood apart from its relation to all the other individuals of which
this whole is composed. Viewed from the latter perspective, every individual 
is a window on the infinite God of the world, and because each is different 
from all others, it offers a unique glimpse of a vista without limits.152  (The
image is Leibniz’s.) 
Because its own power—in contrast to that of the world as whole—is 
finite, no individual being, ourselves included, can ever grasp all the relations 
in which it is enmeshed. Neither can we express, in words and works, the
infinite order these comprise.  For finite beings, this remains a mere possibility
but one that may be more or less fulfilled, even if never completely. In this
sense, one might say that in the third theology I am describing now, God’s 
power has been transferred back to the world—where Aristotle originally
placed it—from the “beyond” of the Christian religion, but in an infinitized
form that Aristotle would have found incomprehensible. 
The clearest expression of this is the outward infinity in number and
kind of the individuals that together make up the world. But another is the
inward infinity of every individual whose significance as a singular and 
irreplaceable perspective on the divinity of the world, without which the
world itself would be incomplete, can never be fully grasped in any period
of time.  The latter transcends every conceivable state of understanding 
or appreciation that a finite being might achieve. It is a form of transcendence. 
But it is one that is internal to the world. It is an immanent transcendence, 
a phrase that may strike some as a contradiction in terms but only because
they assume the truth of a theology in which transcendence is defined as
the unbridgeable gap between the world and a God beyond it rather than
as the “regulative ideal” that sets the infinite horizon of all finite striving— 
151. DWORKIN, supra note 29, at 38–39. 
152. See KRONMAN, supra note 119, at 936.  For a slightly different overall concept 
but a clearly explained version of this world-view, see Brandon C. Look, Gottfried Wilhelm
Leibniz, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Apr. 25, 2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ 
leibniz/#MetLeiIde [https://perma.cc/JQ3A-ZJ8L]. 
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of what Spinoza calls the “love of God.”153 Smith begs the most interesting 
and important questions of “religious truth” by restricting the idea of 
transcendence to the Christian understanding of it.154 
At this point, one might reasonably ask whether my third theology is
not just pantheism by another name—an ancient philosophy dressed up in 
new clothes. The answer is no and it is crucially important to understand 
why.
Aristotle’s metaphysics offers the most philosophically sophisticated 
defense of ancient pantheism, if by this we mean a theology that puts God
in the world and distributes the world’s divinity across all the beings in it.
There is nothing in Aristotle’s world that does not have a direct share in
the “eternal and divine.”155 But Aristotle’s pantheism locates the divinity
of things in their form alone.156 That is because it is conditioned by the finitist
assumptions of Greek intellectualism generally.157  In this respect, it resembles
every other philosophical defense of ancient paganism.  But the modern
paganism I have been describing in the last few paragraphs is based on the 
rejection of these very same assumptions whose authority was first challenged 
and then shattered by the creationist theology of the Christian religion.
The world pantheism, used without qualification, blurs this all-important 
distinction and discredits the version of paganism that one finds, in an
exemplary form, in Spinoza’s Ethics, by suggesting that it is only a modestly
updated version of an ancient theology to which no thoughtful person today 
can subscribe without radical revisions—which of course are precisely the 
ones that Spinoza makes.158 
But that is rhetorical ploy and not a philosophical argument. Moreover, 
the assimilation of the ancient and modern paganisms I have summarily 
described in this paper not only helps to give the theology of the Christian 
religion an unearned advantage in its competition with modern paganism
but also obscures the crucial historical contribution that Christian theology
itself made to the possibility of the emergence of a view like Spinoza’s— 
153. Haim H. Cohn, Spinoza’s Concept of Jewish Law, 3 TEL AVIV U. STUD. L. 11, 
17 (1977).  Spinoza sees the knowledge and love of God as the “highest good” human 
reason can aspire to.  Id. 
154. See SMITH, supra note 1, at 113–14. 
155. THEO GERARD SINNIGE, COSMIC RELIGION IN ARISTOTLE 33 (1972). This is 
premised on the eternity of motion with respect to the unmoved mover.  See Bodnar, supra note 
105. 
156. See Richard Kraut, Aristotle’s Ethics, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (June 15, 
2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-ethics/ [https://perma.cc/P49U-VVGJ] 
(“[T]he highest kind of good must be one that is not desirable for the sake of anything 
else.”).
157. See id.
158. See generally BARUCH SPINOZA, Ethics, in SPINOZA: THE COMPLETE WORKS 213
(Michael L. Morgan ed., Samuel Shirley trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 2002) (1677). 
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or Einstein’s and Dworkin’s, if we take their reverence for Spinoza at face
value.159 
This is a long and complicated story that others have told far better than 
I can—Hans Blumenberg’s research is particularly important in this regard.160 
I only note here that if one looks for the point at which, on the “threshold” 
of modernity (Blumenberg’s phrase161), the idea of immanent transcendence
first began to assume a shape within the precincts of Christian theology
that conformed to the aspirations of the new science of nature, which Spinoza
enthusiastically endorsed, a very plausible candidate would be the writings of
Nicholas of Cusa.162 Cusa invented his infinitely “unfolded” God in response 
to his longing to do justice to God’s infinite power, which the nominalists
of the preceding century had thrown into dramatic relief.163  But Cusa’s
God soon escaped the limits of the Christian imagination altogether and gave 
birth to a re-born paganism—first in the hermetic philosophy of Giordano
Bruno164 and then in Spinoza’s more systematic theology165—that was as
far removed from its ancient predecessor as it was from the Christian 
doctrine of divine creation that occupies the historical space between them 
and leads, in a dialectical fashion, from one to the other. 
VI. THE TRUTH ABOUT GOD? 
We are now in a position to ask how modern paganism (as distinct from 
the ancient version that Smith examines at such length) stacks up against 
the Christian theology to which he unfavorably compares it.  I shall close
with a few thoughts in response to this all-important question.
The two most important things that can be said in favor of the Christian 
religion when we compare it with the ancient version of paganism may also
be said on behalf of modern paganism. The latter provides, just as Christian
159. See generally Gavin Basil McGrath, Religious Liberty in Conservative Liberalism, 
40 AM. J. JURIS. 229 (1995).
160. See generally HANS BLUMENBERG, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE MODERN AGE (Robert
M. Wallace trans., 1999). 
161.  Id. at 455, 470. 
162. See Clyde Lee Miller, Cusanus, Nicolas [Nicolas of Cusa], STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHIL. (June 8, 2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cusanus [https://perma.cc/5TX7-
8P8G].
163. Id.
164. See Dilwyn Knox, Giordano Bruno, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Jan. 11, 2019), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bruno/ [https://perma.cc/B9W8-TRNH].
165. See generally Richard McKeon, Causation and the Geometric Method in the
Philosophy of Spinoza, 39 PHIL. REV. 178 (1930). 
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theology does, a foundation for the value we now assign to the individual 
in every sphere of life. And it explains why, so long as we live, we are bound
to fall short of our ambitions in every enterprise we undertake.  These are
two of the defining characteristics of modern life. We would not want to 
give them up if we could; any theology that fails to supply a foundation 
for them must therefore be dismissed out of hand. But the Christian religion
and modern paganism do this equally well. In this respect, they stand on
a par. But the former has three shortcomings the latter does not, and these,
I think, tip the scales in favor of the modern pagan conception of God. 
The first is a consequence of the doctrine of creation which Christianity 
shares in common with the other Abrahamic religions. 
Creationism is an antiscientific idea. That is because it conflicts with 
the principle of sufficient reason on which all of modern science is based.166 
The principle of sufficient reason holds that for every question there is an
answer, even though we do not know it and never shall.167 It is compatible
with the acceptance of our finitude and the countless limitations entailed
by it. But it is not compatible with an idea of freedom, whether human or 
divine, that is so large that in principle there can be no explanation of why,
in any particular case, it was exercised one way rather than another: every
explanation of this kind assumes a relation of antecedent causation that 
contradicts the very idea of such freedom itself. 
Put differently, science is necessarily deterministic and because the doctrine 
of creation is radically voluntaristic, there can be no room for it within the
realm of science or, more broadly, in any world that assigns science the 
value and importance we do today. Even more obviously, the notion that 
one should worship God because his grace is incomprehensible to us
contradicts the rationalizing aspirations of modern science in the most
direct and obvious way. This is what the fight over the teaching of creationism 
in our public schools is all about.168 
By contrast, the modern paganism that I prefer to the creationist theologies 
of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam provides a metaphysical guarantee for
the principle of sufficient reason—indeed, one might describe it as that principle 
writ large—and simultaneously explains why all our efforts to account 
even for the least of things is bound to fall woefully short.  This seems to 
me a powerful theological advantage in an age in which science—understood
in the most general sense as the disciplined search for a complete and 
166. See Michael Ruse, Creationism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Oct. 10, 2018),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/creationism/ [https://perma.cc/PT6A-PZNK].
167. See Melamed & Lin, supra note 134. 
168. See generally Don E. Scheid, Evolution and Creationism in the Public Schools, 9 J. 
CONTEMP. L. 81 (1983). For the record, I strongly favor teaching creationism—but in a 
class on religion, not one on physics or biology.
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comprehensive understanding of the natural world, including ourselves as
natural beings within it—enjoys greater intellectual and cultural prestige 
than perhaps any other human activity. 
The second shortcoming of Christian theology vis-à-vis its modern pagan
competitor is also one that all the Abrahamic religions share.
Christianity invites—indeed compels—its followers to love their fellow 
human beings and all of God’s other works as well. But they must be loved 
as God’s works and not on their own account.169 To do so is a form of 
idolatry, no different than the worship of Baal. Anyone who says to his 
lover, “I love you for your own sake, full stop, period,” is not loving in 
the way a Christian should.  The Christian love of one person for another
is always indirect—or at least it ought to be.170  It may be that few Christians 
think in these terms but that is because, like most believers in every faith, 
they pay at most irregular attention to the implications of the theology to
which they subscribe.  That is not bad in itself but it does mean that Christian 
doctrine, strictly construed, provides a poor foundation for the pathos of 
love, as most human beings experience it. 
The experience of being joined in love to one particular other person by 
a bond that seems both fated and contingent, and of being utterly dependent
for one’s happiness on the presence of the person one loves, who may
disappear at any moment, is an experience we all know firsthand.  Much
pain is always mixed in it but many still consider love life’s greatest good.  
It is certainly the most democratic. But the Christian idea of God, which 
demands that we strive to love each person as a creature of the greater one 
who made them all, depreciates this very human good by forcing us to value 
it in a currency of a foreign kind.  This is the lesson that Dante’s pilgrim 
learns, at the end of his long voyage, when Beatrice’s teenage smile is lost
in the irradiating brightness of her all-encompassing love of God.171 
169. See, e.g., 1 John 2:15–16 (“Love not the world, neither the things that are in the 
world.  If any man love the world, the love of the Father is not in him.  For all that is in 
the world, the lust of the flesh, and the lust of the eyes, and the  pride of life, is  not the 
Father, but is of the world.”); id. 4:7 (“Dear friends, let us love one another, for love comes 
from God.  Everyone who loves has been born of God and knows God.”); Genesis 9:6 
(“Whoever sheds man’s blood, by man his blood shall be shed, for God made man in his 
own image.”). 
170. See James A. Devereux, The Object of Love in Ficino’s Philosophy, J. HIST. IDEAS
161, 164–67 (1969). 
171. Edward Hagman, Dante’s Vision of God: The End of the Itinerarium Mentis,
106 DANTE STUD. 1, 16 (1988). 
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By contrast, the modern paganism that I am offering as an alternative 
to Christian theology allows us to love the ones we do directly and on their 
own account, because no person is the gift of an otherworldly God but a
“mode” of God itself, to use Spinoza’s term.172 And it does this while
insisting, as Christianity does too, that we are never able to love anyone as 
well as we wish.  The shortfall in loving is a part of human love too, but 
to explain it we do not need the creator God of the Christian religion, who 
can only make us feel that in loving another person for no other reason 
than that he or she is unique in all the world, we fail to be sufficiently 
grateful to God for the grace of his far-greater love and fall into the arch-
sin of pride. 
A third and final shortcoming is peculiar to the Christian religion.
Christianity is set apart from the other Abrahamic religions by the doctrine
of Incarnation, which Judaism and Islam both vehemently reject.173  The
doctrine of Incarnation depends, in turn, on the idea of original sin.174 
There is no way of prying the two apart. Since Paul’s first attempt at 
a “theology of the Cross,” the only way that Christians have been able to 
understand the passion of Christ is as the repayment of a debt that human
beings lacked the power to repay on their own and had incurred through 
their own wrongdoing. To be in debt with no hope of relief is awful enough,
but to be the cause of one’s own suffering is something even worse. It breeds 
resentment and, in time, is sure to poison the already ambiguous feelings 
of gratitude the recipient of such a gift is told he ought to feel toward the
one who rescues him from his self-inflicted pain. Nothing does more damage 
to a human being’s relation to God than the doctrine of original sin: the
Christian doctrine par excellence.175 Friedrich Nietzsche grasped the point 
with characteristic depth and subtlety.176 And like Spinoza—an odd couple
if there ever was one—he, too, understood that the antidote to this singularly
destructive idea is a new religion, which he called the “rebirth of Dionysus,” 
that restores the unity of God and the world but identifies eternity with
infinite power as well—a combination of ideas that no Greek philosopher 
would have comprehended.177 
172. SPINOZA, supra note 158, at 217. 
173. See Paolo Gamberini, Incarnation at the Crossroad: The Doctrine of the Pre-
Existence of Jesus Christ in Dialogue with Judaism and Islam, 73 IRISH THEOLOGICAL Q. 
99, 105 (2008). 
174. TATHA WILEY, ORIGINAL SIN: ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENTS, CONTEMPORARY MEANINGS
205 (2002).
175. See id.
176. See  FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE BIRTH OF TRAGEDY AND THE GENEALOGY OF
MORALS 225 (Francis Golffing trans., Anchor Books 1956) (1887). 
177. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE BIRTH OF TRAGEDY AND THE CASE OF WAGNER 73–74 
(Walter Kaufmann trans., Vintage Books 1967) (1872). 
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VII. CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, modern paganism seems to me a better theology 
than that of the Christian religion, for it captures the strengths while avoiding
the weaknesses of the Christian conception of God. One further reason
may be added: no theology can do without the idea of an eternal and necessary
being. But the world is able to fulfill this requirement on its own without
the need for a creator God beyond it. Because, as Ockham says, it is 
irrational to multiply entities when there is no need to do so, reason itself 
demands that we shave that otherworldly God with Ockham’s razor once 
we have discovered that his agency is not required, as a conceptual matter,
to sustain the eternal and infinite being of the world itself, except on the
assumption that the world cannot possess these attributes on its own, 
which is to beg the question.178 
The theology of modern paganism thus has greater metaphysical economy
than its Christian competitor. This is another point in its favor. The relation 
between them is like that of a training bike to a two-wheeler. The Christian 
religion has helped us learn to ride. It has accustomed us to the novel and,
from an ancient perspective, wholly surprising idea that an eternal being 
can be an infinite one, too. But now that we have grown used to this idea,
the notion of a God beyond the world, which first made it comprehensible
to us in an easily understandable mythical form, is no longer required. Indeed,
like the training wheels on a bike, its continued presence now interferes 
with our riding as smoothly and swiftly as we can. The time has come to let 
it go—or so the modern pagan claims. 
But if we do, we lose the reassurance those training wheels gave us so 
long as we knew they would keep us from falling. 
In the case of the Christian religion, these reassurances are two. The first
is that death is unreal.179 Devout Christians believe they will live on forever
in some recognizably personal form after this life is over.180 The second 
is that God loves us—that we are the objects of his care, just as the world 
as a whole is the product of God’s providential plan.181 
But a grown-up human being will not need the first as an antidote to the 
fear of death. It will be enough to understand that God exists and that while
178. See Roger Ariew, Did Ockham Use His Razor?, 37 FRANCISCAN STUD. 5, 5 (1977). 
179. See ADRIAN WARNOCK, RAISED WITH CHRIST: HOW THE RESURRECTION CHANGES 
EVERYTHING 78 (2010).
180. See id.
181. See REINDER BRUINSMA, KEY WORDS OF THE CHRISTIAN FAITH 14 (2008). 
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one lives, it is possible to draw closer to the eternal God of the world 
through study, reflection, and loving, imaginative work, though the gap
between oneself and God always remains infinitely large.  The only real
cause of despair is the nihilist’s belief that no God of any kind exists, that 
there is nothing but movement and change, and that the idea of eternity is 
a fable. But that is a peculiarly modern species of childishness, too.  Like
his Christian counterpart, the modern pagan is immune to such despair but 
has no need for the idea of a personal immortality to anchor the meaning 
and value of his lifelong pursuit of a better and deeper connection to God, 
though he cannot help but feel the disappointment that attends the experience
of always falling short. But disappointment is not despair. It is only what 
serious human beings experience as they go about the uneasy business of 
living. It is a sign of maturity to see that the meaning and value of life does 
not depend on a belief in a life after death and that no belief of this kind, 
however fervently held, can ever make life less fraught. 
And God’s love for you and me? Love is a kind of dependence. We love
other people because our fulfillment depends on our being able to care for
them for their own sake—something we long to do but never succeed in 
doing as well as we wish. Put differently, love is a sort of lack.  It is 
the feeling one has for something one does not yet possess, or possesses
insecurely. But if that is true, how can we make sense of God’s loving us, 
or anything at all, unless we imagine him to be a dependent and needy
being, too?  We long ago came to regard the idea that God has a voice or 
a face or moods like ours as a childish superstition. The idea that God 
loves us just as we love him is an anthropomorphic mistake of the same 
kind. Of course, we love God. In modern pagan parlance that just means 
that we long to understand and express as much of the infinite and eternal
reality of the world as we are able. But it makes no sense to ascribe to the 
object of our longing the same limitations that define our condition as 
finite beings.  Yet that is precisely what I do when I transpose the love of
other human beings, on which the meaning and value of my life do depend,
to a God that I imagine as a person like myself, only larger and more
powerful. This security blanket too is one that a thoughtful human being 
can live without. He or she will see that it rests on the same confusion as 
other simpler anthropomorphisms at which we have learned to smile. 
Of course, I know how difficult it is to give up the false security the
training wheels of Christian doctrine provide.  But it does not follow that
modern paganism is false.  It only means that its truth is unlikely to be evident
to more than a few.  Yet has it ever been otherwise so far as religious truth
is concerned? “All things excellent are as difficult as they are rare.”182 
182. SPINOZA, supra note 158, at 382. 
448
KRONMAN FINAL TO PRINT (1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/13/2019 1:40 PM      
  
     
  
    
 
  
     
 




   
  
    
 
     
    
     
     
      
 
       
  






[VOL. 56: 419, 2019] Is Modern Paganism True?
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
I also know that when we return from the closet to which we have retired 
for the sake of learning the truth about God, and descend again to the world 
of affairs, it would be laughably imprudent to insist others acknowledge
the truth of my theology, or attempt to make of it a public doctrine that might
serve as a source of political solidarity—all with new symbols, rituals, and 
the like. I am happy to concede that in these respects, my modern paganism 
is politically sterile.
So far as religion is concerned, our public practice should be one of tolerance 
and accommodation. To the extent the culture wars are a battle between
opposing theologies, greater neutrality is called for. Those who attack the 
slightest endorsement of religion, who seek to scrub our history clean of 
every reference to God, who with evangelical fervor condemn even the 
conscientious judgment of some that others among us are living in sin, are 
zealots engaged in a religious campaign to vindicate their conception of the
ultimate source of the meaning and value of human life—though their religion,
as I suggested at the start, is a form of Kantianism that is more Christian 
than pagan in its provenance. They should not be allowed to capture the 
law for their partisan advantage. In all these respects, I am with Smith one
hundred percent. But my political agreement should not be mistaken for 
an acceptance of the theological judgment he reaches at the end of his book,183 
which rests, I think, on a failure to appreciate the metaphysical distinction 
between paganism ancient and modern. Spinozism may be politically sterile. 
But it is theologically true, and one of the most precious freedoms our 
American system of religious liberty affords us is the freedom to argue
extravagant propositions like this without the fear of anything more terrible 
than the bewilderment or disapproval of one’s friends.
183. See SMITH, supra note 1, at 337–79. 
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